The government has rejected a raft of major constitutional reform proposals aimed at reducing political influence over key state institutions, strengthening parliamentary independence, reforming judicial appointments and expanding public participation in governance, opting instead to retain most of the existing constitutional arrangements.

Its response to the Constitution Review Committee (CRC) recommendations shows a consistent pattern of rejecting proposals that would have transferred key appointment powers from the Executive to independent institutions, increased transparency and accountability, or curtailed discretionary powers exercised by political office holders.

While accepting a handful of technical reforms, the government rejected recommendations touching on presidential succession, appointments to constitutional bodies, the Electoral Commission, Parliament, the judiciary, campaign financing and the Council of State, arguing that many of the proposed changes were unnecessary, already addressed by existing laws or could create legal and institutional complications.

Presidency

On presidential succession, the government accepted the recommendation to amend Articles 60(8) and 60(11) to ensure that the President or Vice-President is not deemed unable to perform presidential functions merely because they are outside Ghana.

It explained that modern governance requires both office holders to travel without automatically triggering constitutional succession mechanisms.

However, it rejected a proposal to amend Articles 60(11), (12) and (13) to allow Cabinet to elect one of its members to serve as President for a three-month caretaker period when both the offices of President and Vice-President become vacant simultaneously.

Government argued that although such a situation would be extraordinary, allowing Cabinet to elect an acting President would confer executive authority on someone who had never been elected to that office and therefore lacked democratic legitimacy. It maintained that the existing constitutional succession arrangements were adequate.

Parliament

The government also dismissed recommendations affecting Parliament.

It rejected proposals requiring Majority and Minority caucuses to elect their leaders by secret ballot and permitting caucus members to remove those leaders through internal elections initiated by one-quarter of members.

Government said Parliament’s Standing Orders already regulate these matters, making constitutional amendments unnecessary.

One recommendation it accepted was an amendment to Article 104(4) requiring open, recorded voting on all legislative and constitutional matters except elections or removal of persons.

According to government, public voting would deepen democracy, transparency and accountability.

Anti-carpet crossing

The CRC recommended tightening Article 97(1)(g) to ensure Members of Parliament who resign from or are expelled by the political parties on whose ticket they were elected automatically lose their seats if they subsequently support another party.

It also proposed rules covering independent MPs who later align with political parties.

Government rejected the proposal, insisting the existing anti-carpet crossing provision already protects Ghana’s party-based parliamentary democracy and ensures MPs honour the electoral mandate given by constituents.

Contempt powers retained

Government also rejected proposals limiting Parliament’s contempt powers.

The Committee had recommended amending Article 122 to make it clear that constitutional guarantees of free speech and media freedom override Parliament’s power to punish people or media organisations for publications considered critical, offensive or unfair.

Government maintained that Parliament rarely exercises its contempt powers and argued the existing provisions remain essential to protecting Parliament’s authority.

It warned that weakening those powers could diminish Parliament’s institutional standing.

Public participation

Another major recommendation rejected was a proposal to constitutionally guarantee public participation in lawmaking.

The CRC wanted Parliament and its committees required to undertake meaningful stakeholder consultations before passing legislation.

It also proposed mandatory town hall meetings by MPs during every parliamentary recess, funded through Parliament or the National Commission for Civic Education.

Government said public consultation was already standard parliamentary practice and argued constitutionalising the requirement could encourage litigation challenging the validity of legislation over alleged consultation failures.

It also rejected mandatory town hall meetings, saying they could instead be addressed administratively or through ordinary legislation.

Ministers escape sanctions

The CRC further proposed requiring every Act of Parliament dependent on regulations to specify deadlines of no more than 12 months for laying those regulations, with Ministers facing votes of censure for non-compliance.

Government rejected the proposal, arguing Parliament already sets such deadlines in legislation where necessary.

It further warned that constitutional deadlines would expose the Executive to litigation whenever implementation delays occurred, even where delays were unavoidable.

Electoral Commission appointments

Government also rejected proposals to reduce presidential influence over appointments to the Electoral Commission.

The Committee had recommended transferring recruitment and selection of the Electoral Commission Chairperson and Deputy Commissioners to the Council of State, with the Public Services Commission administering the recruitment process.

Govt refused both recommendations.

It also rejected calls for constitutional amendments regulating campaign financing, arguing such reforms were unnecessary.

Death of presidential candidates

The Committee proposed amending Article 50 to require the Electoral Commission to establish constitutional procedures governing the death of a presidential candidate before elections.

Government also dismissed this recommendation.

Key constitutional offices

Perhaps one of the most significant rejections concerned appointments to major constitutional offices.

The Committee proposed transferring recruitment and nomination responsibilities for offices including the Chief Justice, Electoral Commission, Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ), Auditor-General and other constitutional offices from the President to the Council of State, with parliamentary approval where required.

Government rejected the proposal, effectively preserving presidential appointment powers.

Council of State

Government similarly rejected proposals to extend the tenure of Council of State members beyond the President’s term and to limit members to two terms.

It argued the proposal created significant political and institutional risks.

The administration also opposed recommendations requiring the Council’s decisions, advice and recommendations to be made public while allowing only confidential presidential advice to remain private.

Government maintained there was no need to constitutionalise the Council’s internal procedures.

Judiciary

The government accepted only one major judicial reform—placing a cap on the size of the Supreme Court.

While the Committee proposed limiting the Court to 15 Justices, including the Chief Justice, government proposed a higher ceiling of 19 Justices, saying this would still promote efficiency while managing public expenditure.

However, it rejected recommendations to divide the Supreme Court into separate Original Jurisdiction and Appellate Divisions, arguing internal court arrangements should not be entrenched in the Constitution.

Court reforms rejected

Government also rejected proposals to make the Court of Appeal the final appellate court for most civil and criminal cases, leaving the Supreme Court to handle only constitutional matters, novel legal questions and issues of public importance.

It similarly opposed recommendations removing the Chief Justice from membership of the High Court and Court of Appeal, creating a President of the Court of Appeal, introducing regional supervising judges for the High Court and constitutionally mandating objective rules for empanelling judges.

Regional tribunals remain

The Committee recommended removing Regional Tribunals from the Constitution and reorganising the judiciary into Superior Courts, Primary Courts and lower courts established by Parliament.

Government rejected both proposals, insisting the existing judicial structure remains appropriate.

It also rejected changes to qualification requirements for High Court judges and proposals establishing separate constitutional appointment procedures and harmonised conditions of service for Circuit and District Court judges, arguing current statutory provisions were sufficient.

Chief Justice appointments

Government further rejected sweeping reforms to judicial appointments.

The Committee proposed a competitive process for appointing the Chief Justice, involving public advertisement, Judicial Council shortlisting, interviews by the Council of State, submission of two ranked nominees to the President and completion of appointments within 90 days.

It also rejected proposals requiring the Judicial Council, in consultation with the Council of State, to submit two nominees for every Supreme Court vacancy for presidential selection.

By rejecting these recommendations, government retained the existing constitutional appointment framework under which the President continues to exercise the central role in appointing the Chief Justice and Supreme Court Justices, subject to the constitutional approval processes already in place.

The government also rejected another broad set of constitutional reform proposals that sought to reduce executive influence over the judiciary, strengthen anti-corruption measures, depoliticise state institutions, reform land governance and professionalise the public service, reinforcing concerns that many of the Constitution Review Committee’s (CRC) most far-reaching governance reforms have been shelved.

The latest government response shows it declined recommendations that would have transferred appointment powers from the President to independent institutions, tightened asset declaration rules, limited the Attorney-General’s prosecutorial powers, insulated state-owned enterprises from political interference and strengthened transparency in the management of public lands and natural resources.

While government maintained that many of the proposals could be addressed through ordinary legislation rather than constitutional amendments, the decisions leave intact the Executive’s extensive influence over several constitutional and public institutions.

Court of Appeal and High Court appointments

The government rejected proposals to fundamentally change how Justices of the Court of Appeal and High Court are appointed.

The Committee had recommended amending Article 144(3) to require the Judicial Council to publicly advertise vacancies and invite nominations and expressions of interest whenever judicial positions become available.

Under the proposal, the Judicial Council, working with the Judicial Committee of the Council of State, would have screened applicants and submitted nominees to the President for appointment, subject to approval by Parliament through a simple majority.

Government rejected the proposal, thereby retaining the existing appointment system.

Judicial Secretary

The Committee also proposed elevating the Office of the Judicial Secretary into a constitutional office with clearly defined provisions governing appointment, qualifications and functions.

Government rejected the recommendation, arguing that the current legal and administrative framework governing the office is adequate.

Judiciary budget

Another rejected proposal sought to strengthen the financial independence of the Judiciary.

The Committee recommended amending Article 179(5) to require the President to lay the Judiciary’s budget estimates before Parliament without any revision or alteration.

Government dismissed the proposal, saying it added little to existing constitutional provisions.

Attorney-General retains powers

One of the most significant anti-corruption proposals rejected concerned the powers of the Attorney-General.

The Committee recommended removing the Attorney-General’s constitutional authority to prosecute corruption and corruption-related offences.

It also proposed requiring the Attorney-General to obtain leave of court before discontinuing any criminal prosecution.

Government refused both recommendations, preserving the Attorney-General’s prosecutorial powers.

Wider asset declaration rejected

Government also rejected proposals to significantly expand the list of public officials required to declare assets.

The Committee had proposed expressly including members of the Armed Forces, Police Service, other security agencies, independent constitutional office holders, members of statutory regulatory bodies and District Chief Executives.

Government argued that Article 286(5)(j) already permits Parliament to expand the categories of persons required to declare assets through legislation, making constitutional amendment unnecessary.

Tougher unexplained wealth regime rejected

The Committee further proposed sweeping reforms to Ghana’s asset declaration regime.

These included constitutional recognition of unexplained wealth audits, lifestyle audits, reverse burden of proof provisions for unexplained increases in wealth, stronger investigative powers for oversight bodies and stricter filing deadlines.

Public officers would have been required to declare assets within 15 days of assuming office, submit annual declarations and file final declarations within 30 days of leaving office.

Government rejected the recommendations in their entirety.

Conflict of interest

Government also rejected proposals to strengthen conflict of interest rules.

The Committee had recommended amending Article 284 to establish a constitutional Code of Conduct for public officers requiring mandatory disclosure of conflicts, recusal from conflicted decisions, sanctions for violations and minimum ethical standards.

It also proposed establishing an Anti-Corruption and Ethics Commission to enforce the regime.

Government maintained that the existing constitutional framework remains sufficient and could be supplemented through legislation.

Govt Statistician

Another rejected proposal sought to rename the Government Statistician as the State Statistician and make the appointment subject to the advice of the Council of State.

The Committee also proposed a single non-renewable 10-year tenure or retirement at 65 years, whichever came earlier.

Government rejected the proposal.

National Development Planning

Government similarly rejected extensive reforms strengthening the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC).

The Committee proposed making the NDPC the central coordinating, monitoring and evaluation body for the National Development Plan while leaving implementation to Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) and Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs).

It also recommended significantly expanding the Commission’s membership to include the Finance Minister, Governor of the Bank of Ghana, Government Statistician, heads of the Land Use and Spatial Planning Authority and Environmental Protection Authority, alongside representatives from academia, organised labour, civil society, the National House of Chiefs and the engineering profession. Government rejected the entire package.

National development planning

The administration also refused recommendations requiring Parliament to enact framework legislation governing national development planning.

The Committee had further proposed compelling the President to submit annual reports to Parliament detailing progress in implementing the Directive Principles of State Policy.

It also wanted the Finance Minister required to demonstrate how each national budget advances those constitutional principles.

Political parties and presidential candidates would additionally have been required to submit their manifestos to the NDPC at least six months before general elections for consistency checks against the National Development Plan. Government rejected all these recommendations.

Lands and natural resources

Among the most far-reaching proposals rejected were reforms to land administration.

The Committee recommended removing public lands from presidential trusteeship and vesting them directly in the people of Ghana to be managed in trust for present and future generations.

It proposed making the Lands Commission the principal constitutional trustee and manager of public lands while imposing fiduciary duties of loyalty, transparency and sustainability on all public institutions involved in land administration.

The reforms also sought to strengthen compulsory land acquisition by requiring prior compensation payments, resettlement planning and enforceable reversionary rights.

Government rejected every recommendation.

Stool lands

Government also rejected recommendations abolishing the Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands as an independent constitutional office.

The Committee wanted its functions transferred to the Lands Commission through a new Rent Management Division responsible for collecting revenues from stool, family, clan, quarter and Tindana lands.

It also proposed replacing the constitutional phrase “subjects of the stool” with “members of the stool community” and imposing enforceable fiduciary duties on traditional authorities managing stool lands. Government rejected all the proposals.

Non-citizen land ownership

The Committee further proposed relaxing constitutional consequences for unlawful freehold land transactions involving foreigners.

Instead of declaring such transactions void, they would automatically convert into 50-year leaseholds.

Leases exceeding the constitutional 50-year limit would automatically be reduced to the lawful duration.

The Committee also wanted provisions regulating joint ownership between citizens and non-citizens elevated from the Land Act into the Constitution. Government rejected the recommendations.

Natural resources

Government equally declined sweeping reforms to natural resource governance.

The Committee proposed requiring parliamentary approval before the Executive signs natural resource concessions, creating a national coordinating authority for natural resources governance, introducing constitutional public trust principles, recognising ocean governance and the blue economy, creating the offence of ecocide and allocating a percentage of gross mineral revenues directly to mining communities. None of the proposals was accepted.

Public service reforms

Government also rejected proposals strengthening the independence of the Public Services Commission.

The Committee had recommended empowering the Commission to issue Constitutional Instruments governing protection of public servants and grievance procedures without requiring prior presidential approval. Government refused both proposals.

Civil Service

The Committee also sought merit-based appointment of the Head of Civil Service through a competitive process conducted by the Public Services Commission with advice from the Council of State.

It proposed qualification requirements together with a single non-renewable 10-year term or retirement at 65 years.

Government rejected the proposal, arguing the Constitution already allows merit-based appointments.

State-owned enterprises

Several recommendations intended to reduce political control over State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) were also rejected.

The Committee proposed establishing the State Interests and Governance Authority (SIGA) as a constitutional institution responsible for overseeing government ownership interests.

It further recommended barring Ministers, Deputy Ministers and Members of Parliament from serving on SOE boards, requiring merit-based appointments, granting boards authority over chief executives and imposing fiduciary duties on directors.

Government rejected the proposals, maintaining they could be implemented through ordinary legislation.

Public servants and politics

The Committee also recommended constitutionally prohibiting public servants from engaging in active party politics or displaying partisan affiliation while in office.

Government declined the proposal, saying Supreme Court jurisprudence already provides sufficient guidance on political neutrality.

Children’s rights

Finally, government rejected proposals to strengthen constitutional protection of children’s bodily integrity.

The Committee had recommended prohibiting irreversible non-consensual medical or surgical procedures on children unless strictly necessary to prevent serious harm, providing special protections for intersex children, strengthening consent safeguards and requiring Parliament to enact legislation regulating long-term medical decisions affecting minors.

Government rejected the recommendations, leaving the existing constitutional provisions unchanged.

The government also rejected another broad set of recommendations turning down proposals that would have reduced presidential influence over local government, the security services, public administration and the media, while also rejecting reforms aimed at strengthening accountability, decentralisation and institutional independence.

The latest batch of responses, contained in the government’s White Paper on the Constitutional Review Committee’s report, shows a consistent pattern of rejecting recommendations that would have shifted powers away from the Executive or imposed stronger constitutional safeguards on public institutions.

The government maintained that many of the proposed reforms were either unnecessary because they could be addressed through ordinary legislation or administrative practice, or were too rigid for inclusion in the Constitution.

Local govt reforms rejected

One of the most significant proposals rejected relates to the tenure of District Chief Executives (DCEs).

The CRC proposed amending Article 246(2) to impose a maximum of two five-year terms for DCEs, whether consecutive or otherwise, in order to prevent indefinite political appointments and promote leadership renewal. The government rejected the proposal outright.

It also refused to create the constitutional office of Deputy District Chief Executive.

The committee had proposed that Deputy DCEs be elected on the same ticket as DCEs and that both could not be of the same sex, a measure intended to promote gender balance and leadership continuity. Government declined the proposal.

District Assemblies composition maintained

The government also rejected sweeping reforms to the composition of District Assemblies.

The CRC wanted 30 per cent of Assembly members to remain appointed but selected through a structured allocation instead of purely presidential appointments.

Under the proposal, 25 per cent of the appointed members would come from traditional authorities, 20 per cent from local women leaders, 20 per cent from small business owners, 20 per cent from persons with disabilities and youth under 35 years, and the remaining 15 per cent from community-based NGOs.

The proposed Devolution Commission would have supervised the appointment process for all categories except traditional authority representatives. Government rejected the entire proposal.

Bigger Common Fund rejected

Government also turned down recommendations to significantly strengthen local government financing.

The committee proposed increasing the District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF) from the current constitutional minimum to at least 10 per cent of total national revenue.

It further proposed integrating the DACF Administrator into a new Devolution Commission, prohibiting central government from spending district allocations on behalf of assemblies, and preventing Members of Parliament from receiving DACF allocations. Government rejected every recommendation.

Fiscal decentralisation rejected

The White Paper also rejected proposals to grant greater financial autonomy to districts.

The CRC wanted District Assemblies to pay salaries and allowances of DCEs, Assembly staff and Assembly members entirely from internally generated funds supported by locally assigned tax bases. Government declined the proposal.

It also rejected the establishment of an Independent Devolution Commission, which was intended to become Ghana’s permanent constitutional body responsible for designing, supervising and coordinating decentralisation while enjoying guaranteed funding from the Consolidated Fund.

Presidential control over police retained

The government also refused proposals that would have reduced presidential control over the Ghana Police Service.

The committee had proposed that future Inspectors-General of Police (IGPs) should no longer be directly chosen by the President.

Instead, the Police Council would shortlist at least three Commissioners of Police from whom the President would make an appointment. Government rejected the recommendation.

The White Paper also dismissed proposals to grant the IGP a fixed single six-year non-renewable term or service until age 65, with removal only on constitutionally defined grounds after investigation by the Police Council.

Human rights obligations rejected

Another rejected proposal sought to impose an explicit constitutional obligation on the IGP to ensure that policing always complies with human rights, legality and proportionality principles. Government rejected that recommendation.

Similarly, it declined amendments that would constitutionally define the Ghana Police Service as the country’s primary civilian law enforcement institution and require the State to adequately equip and resource the service.

Police Council powers unchanged

Government also rejected recommendations empowering the Police Council to issue regulations through Constitutional Instruments for administering the Police Service.

The proposal required consultation with both the Police Management Board and a proposed Independent Security Sector Oversight Commission.

The White Paper dismissed the recommendation.

Regional Police Committees unchanged

The CRC also sought to reform Regional Police Committees by removing Ministers of State and representatives of the Ghana Bar Association.

Instead, it proposed including a junior police officer, a Divisional Commander, a representative of CHRAJ and making the senior-most regional police officer the Chair of the committee. Government rejected the restructuring.

Prison Service reforms rejected

Government similarly declined proposals affecting the Ghana Prisons Service.

The committee recommended that future Directors-General should be appointed from a shortlist of at least three qualified senior officers nominated by the Prisons Council instead of direct presidential selection.

It also wanted constitutional guarantees of political neutrality for the Director-General. Both proposals were rejected.

Government further dismissed recommendations granting the Director-General a single six-year non-renewable term, security of tenure until age 65, and removal only on specified constitutional grounds.

Executive control over prisons retained

The committee further proposed giving the Director-General exclusive operational authority over inmate custody, security, welfare and rehabilitation while preventing Presidents, Ministers and other public officials from issuing operational directives to prisons.

Government rejected the recommendation, preserving the existing constitutional arrangement.

Military deployment proposals rejected

Government also refused recommendations aimed at narrowing the domestic role of the Armed Forces.

The CRC wanted military deployments in civil matters restricted to exceptional situations where the Police Service could no longer manage serious security threats.

Under the proposal, soldiers would operate under police command, military personnel would follow civilian policing standards, human rights safeguards would apply, the use of force would be tightly restricted, soldiers would no longer provide routine protection to public officials except the President and Defence Minister under regulated conditions, and military officers assigned to such duties would wear civilian clothing. Government rejected the proposal, arguing that it would undermine operational flexibility required for national security.

Independent security oversight rejected

Government also rejected proposals establishing an Independent Security Services Oversight Authority (ISSOA).

The proposed seven-member body would have provided civilian oversight over security agencies’ interactions with civilians.

Its membership would have included a retired Superior Court judge, a human rights lawyer, a CHRAJ representative, retired senior police and military officers, a civil society representative and a licensed clinical psychologist. Government declined the recommendation.

Constitutional policing principles rejected

The White Paper further dismissed proposals introducing a new constitutional Article 35A establishing binding principles for all security agencies.

The proposed article required security agencies to prioritise protection of human dignity and constitutional rights, ensure proportional use of force and remain subject to civilian control, parliamentary oversight and judicial scrutiny. Government rejected the proposal.

Media reforms rejected

Government also declined every major recommendation affecting the National Media Commission (NMC).

The committee wanted the Commission empowered to investigate threats against press freedom, summon witnesses and documents, issue cease-and-desist directives, conduct hearings and initiate legal proceedings in serious press freedom cases.

The proposals also included making the Executive Secretary an ex-officio Commissioner, providing constitutional protection for the Executive Secretary’s appointment and tenure, introducing restrictions on media ownership concentration, promoting transparency in media financing, adopting technology-neutral regulation covering all media platforms, and constitutionally protecting the NMC’s budget. Government rejected the entire package.

Periodic constitutional review rejected

The CRC proposed mandatory constitutional reviews every 25 years, supported by public participation and publication of review reports to ensure the Constitution evolves with society. Government rejected the proposal.

New amendment category ignored

The committee also sought to introduce a new category of semi-entrenched constitutional provisions.

These provisions would no longer require national referenda but instead could be amended by a 75 per cent parliamentary majority.

Although included in the committee’s recommendations, the government’s response did not accept the proposal, reinforcing its broader reluctance to alter existing constitutional amendment procedures.

Taken together with earlier decisions rejecting reforms affecting judicial appointments, anti-corruption measures, presidential appointments, land administration, public service independence and Electoral Commission appointments, the White Paper paints a picture of a government that accepted relatively limited administrative reforms while rejecting the overwhelming majority of proposals designed to reduce executive discretion, strengthen independent constitutional bodies and shift decision-making power away from political office holders.