Ghana is facing growing scrutiny over its role in the international cocaine trade after nearly 20 tonnes of the illicit drug, comprising consignments seized within the country and shipments originating from Ghana intercepted abroad, were recorded in a series of operations between 2025 and November 2026.

The seizures, involving major ports and airports in Europe and the Middle East, expose the scale of trafficking networks exploiting Ghana’s commercial and transport routes.

15,103.7kg seized abroad, 4,659.42kg

The quantities include 15,103.7 kilogrammes intercepted outside the country and a reported 4,659.42 kilogrammes seized domestically, bringing the combined figure to 19,763.12 kilogrammes.

Equivalent to 395 bags of 50kg cement

The total is equivalent to approximately 395 bags of 50 kilogrammes each.

The volume of cocaine seized also raises questions about the quantities that may have passed through undetected and the extent to which criminal networks have penetrated legitimate trade and transport operations.

The foreign seizures involved consignments concealed in wood, cassava flour, coconut oil containers and wooden boxes of coconuts, as well as cocaine carried by an air passenger.

Within Ghana, traffickers allegedly used tipper trucks, packaged gari, gari sacks and other means to conceal and transport the drug.

The repeated interceptions have heightened concerns about the effectiveness of Ghana’s intelligence gathering, port and airport surveillance, cargo inspection and anti-narcotics operations.

They also raise questions about the financiers, local facilitators, exporters, transporters and international networks behind the consignments.

4,500kg – Port of Amsterdam in the Netherlands

The largest reported foreign seizure occurred in June 2025 at the Port of Amsterdam in the Netherlands, where Dutch authorities intercepted nearly 4,500 kilogrammes of cocaine concealed in a shipment of wood from Ghana.

The seizure was described as the largest ever recorded at the port.

2,829kg – Antwerp in Belgium

In November 2025, Belgian authorities discovered 2,829 kilogrammes of cocaine concealed in cassava flour shipped from Tema to Antwerp.

1,158kg – Antwerp in Belgium

A further 1,158 kilogrammes shipped from Ghana was seized at the same port in December 2025.

70kg – Lebanon

In late November 2025, Lebanese Customs seized approximately 70 kilogrammes of cocaine originating from Ghana.

The incident was publicly reported in December 2025.

The drug was concealed inside coconut oil containers packed across 40 cartons.

The interceptions continued in 2026.

2,600kg – Port of Valencia, Spain

On August 22, Spanish authorities seized 2,600 kilogrammes of cocaine hidden inside wooden boxes of coconuts shipped from Ghana to the Port of Valencia.

3,900kg – French port of Dunkirk

On September 10, 2026, French customs officials intercepted nearly 3.9 tonnes, equivalent to 3,900 kilogrammes, of cocaine shipped from Ghana to the northern French port of Dunkirk.

46.7kg – Beirut’s Rafic Hariri International Airport in Lebanon

The latest reported foreign seizure occurred on October 31, 2026, when a Syrian passenger carrying 46.7 kilogrammes of cocaine from Accra was arrested at Beirut’s Rafic Hariri International Airport in Lebanon.

The listed foreign interceptions amount to 15,103.7 kilogrammes, with the two Antwerp seizures requiring confirmation as separate cases.

3,319.68kg – Pedu Junction in Cape Coast

Within Ghana, the largest reported seizure was made in March 2025 at Pedu Junction in Cape Coast, where the National Intelligence Bureau intercepted 3,319.68 kilogrammes of cocaine buried under sand in a tipper truck.

The Bureau valued the consignment at more than US$350 million.

192kg – Oyarifa

Another 192 kilogrammes was seized at Oyarifa in March 2025, adding to evidence of cocaine movements beyond the country’s major ports and airports.

89.74kg – Kotoka International Airport

In April 2025, officers at the Kotoka International Airport intercepted 89.74 kilogrammes of cocaine packed into 73 slabs and destined for the Netherlands.

In February 2026, another consignment was discovered at Kotoka International Airport, concealed in packaged gari. The quantity seized was not disclosed.

866kg – Tema Harbour enclave

In August 2026, security operatives intercepted 866 parcels of cocaine concealed in gari sacks at the Tema Harbour enclave as the consignment was being loaded for export.

The supplied record gives the weight as 866 kilogrammes.

192 slabs – Wa

In September 2026, authorities seized 192 slabs or wraps of cocaine in Wa after the consignment had reportedly been moved from Kumasi.

The weight of the seizure was not disclosed.

The Wa seizure is particularly significant because it raises concerns about the possible diversion of cocaine into the domestic market rather than its movement exclusively through Ghana as a transit point.

Political influence and terrorist financing risks

The cocaine trade is not merely a law-enforcement problem.

Its enormous profit margins create opportunities for criminal networks to corrupt public institutions, compromise security personnel and cultivate relationships with politically influential individuals.

Trafficking organisations with access to millions of dollars can use their financial power to bribe officials, frustrate investigations, influence prosecutions and secure protection for their operations.

Where such networks gain access to political and administrative structures, they can undermine public institutions and weaken the rule of law.

The concern for Ghana is whether the proceeds of the trade are being channelled into legitimate businesses, property transactions and other financial activities to conceal their criminal origins.

The possibility that drug money could be used to influence political financing, public procurement or appointments also demands serious attention.

There is an additional national security risk. Drug trafficking proceeds can provide funding for violent extremist and terrorist organisations operating in parts of West Africa.

The same financial networks, illicit trade routes and corrupt relationships that sustain organised drug trafficking can create opportunities for terrorist financing.

There is, however, no evidence in the supplied seizure record establishing that any of the Ghana-linked consignments financed terrorist organisations or that political actors were involved.

The risk lies in the potential for the enormous proceeds of the cocaine trade to be diverted into such activities if financial investigations and enforcement remain weak.

Ghana’s international reputation at risk

The repeated interception of large cocaine shipments identified as originating from Ghana threatens the country’s reputation as a reliable trading and investment destination.

When foreign authorities repeatedly discover cocaine in consignments linked to a particular country, that country risks being associated with international trafficking networks.

Ghanaian exports, shipping companies, freight forwarders and legitimate traders could consequently face heightened scrutiny, more intensive cargo inspections and additional compliance requirements.

Such measures could increase shipping costs, delay legitimate exports and weaken the competitiveness of Ghanaian businesses.

Exporters who have no connection to the drug trade may nevertheless suffer reputational damage and additional commercial burdens.

The interceptions also raise questions about the integrity of Ghana’s ports, airports and cargo-clearance systems.

Ghana’s ambition to serve as a regional commercial and logistics hub depends heavily on international confidence in its ability to secure trade routes against criminal exploitation.

Public health: The domestic market threat

The seizure of 192 slabs or wraps in Wa, reportedly transported from Kumasi, raises a further concern: whether some cocaine passing through Ghana is being diverted into local distribution networks.

An expanding domestic market could expose more people, particularly young people, to cocaine use and dependence.

Cocaine is a powerful stimulant that can increase heart rate and blood pressure and cause serious cardiovascular complications, including heart attacks and strokes. Heavy or prolonged use can also result in seizures, paranoia, psychosis and severe psychological dependence.

The social consequences can extend to families, workplaces and communities through addiction, financial distress, drug-related crime and the loss of productive capacity.

A growing problem would also place additional pressure on Ghana’s health services, mental health facilities and addiction-treatment programmes.

The authorities must therefore look beyond the quantities intercepted and establish whether cocaine is increasingly being distributed and consumed within the country.

Follow the money and dismantle the networks

The repeated seizures demand a coordinated investigation into the people and organisations behind the consignments.

The focus must move beyond intercepting drugs to identifying the owners, financiers, exporters, freight handlers, transporters and local facilitators who make the trade possible.

The Narcotics Control Commission, National Intelligence Bureau, Ghana Police Service, Customs Division of the Ghana Revenue Authority and other security agencies must strengthen intelligence-sharing and investigate possible weaknesses in cargo inspection, port surveillance, airport screening and export documentation.

Authorities must also examine how consignments were concealed in ordinary commodities such as wood, cassava flour, gari, coconut oil containers and boxes of coconuts, and whether legitimate businesses or shipping arrangements were exploited.

Most importantly, investigations must follow the money. The identification and prosecution of financiers, organisers, corrupt officials and other beneficiaries are essential to dismantling the networks rather than merely disrupting individual shipments.

The authorities must also publish credible information on the outcomes of investigations, prosecutions, asset seizures and disciplinary action against officials found to have facilitated the trade.

The nearly 20-tonne seizure record is both evidence of interceptions by security agencies and a warning about the scale of the trafficking threat.

The more troubling question is how much cocaine linked to Ghana has escaped detection, who is financing the operations and whether the networks have acquired influence within institutions responsible for protecting the country.

Ghana cannot afford to allow its ports, airports and commercial corridors to become instruments of international drug trafficking.

The response must be sustained, transparent and strong enough to reach the financiers and protectors behind the trade.